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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BETTE WYCALIS,
Plaintiff#Respondent,
vs.
CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION; GUARDIAN TITLE
COMPANY OF UTAH and WARREN H.
CURLISS, its President; U.S.
LIFE OF UTAH, Trustee; CITY
CONSUMER SERVICES, INC., Bene!
ficiary; R. M. WALL; GARY L.
MEREDITH and LYLE G. MEREDITH;
ED MAAS; RANDY KRANTZ, B. BRAD
CHRISTENSON, DEBRA CHRISTENSON,
and JOHN DOES I through V,

Case No.s 860172 and 860156
Priority No. 13b

Defendants** Appellants.
RESPONSIVE BRIEF OF RESPONDENT BETTE WYCALIS
(860156)
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the District Court err when it ruled that a trustee
under a deed of trust is the agent of a non^trustor co^maker on
a note secured by the deed of trust?
Did the District Court err when it held that the loss of
the security is not chargeable to the beneficiary any more than
it is chargeable to the co^makers?
Did the District Court err in ruling that the one action
rule is not applicable because the security had been lost and
the loss of the security was through no fault of the
beneficiary?

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in favor of
plaintiff/respondent Bette Wycalis (hereinafter "Wycalis") as
against defendants/appellants Krantz and Christenson
(hereinafter Krantz and Christenson).

Wycalis' complaint

alleged several causes of action including that against Krantz
and Christenson as makers of a promissory note which was in
default.

(R. 1*6.)

Three of the makers of the note, Randy

Krantz, B. Brad Christenson and Debra Christenson denied
liability on the note.

(R. 4CU42.) Nonjury trial was held on

September 26, 1985. At trial the facts of the case were
presented by stipulation of the parties, which stipulation was
read into the record.

(R.

490*504.)

offered and received into evidence.

Exhibits 1 * 7 were
(R. 498.) The matter was

submitted to the court on simultaneous memoranda and reply
memoranda.

On January 21, 1986, the court entered its

memorandum decision holding that Krantz and Christenson were
liable to Wycalis on the promissory note.

(R. 537*541.)

Judgment was entered against Krantz and Christenson on February
14, 1986, and they appeal seeking a reversal of that judgment.
PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Wycalis filed her complaint in the Second Judicial District
Court of Weber County on May 7, 1984.

Initially, Wycalis named

fifteen defendants. Of those fifteen defendants, only thirteen
were served with process. The two defendants that were not
2

served with process were Ed Maas

and Sharon Miles.

Of the remaining thirteen defendants, five were dismissed
pursuant to stipulation after initial discovery had been
completed.

Those defendants were Gary h.

Meredith, Lyle G.

Meredith, City Consumer Services, U.S. Title and City Federal
Savings.
Defendant R. M. Wall responded to Wycalis1 complaint by
filing a disclaimer as to Count V of Wycalis' complaint (quiet
title).
Defendants Roy L. Miller and R & C Associates were served
with process, but did not answer and have been dismissed
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Summary judgment was entered against Wycalis with respect
to her claims against defendants Guardian Title and Warren H.
Curlis, its President.
Judgment was entered against the remaining three
defendants, Randy Krantz, B. Brad Christenson, and Debra
Christenson in favor of Wycalis on February 14, 1986.

These

defendants have appealed that judgment, which is the subject
matter of this brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about July 1, 1980, defendant R & C Associates (R

& C) by and through Roy L. Miller, general partner, and Randy
Krantz, B. Brad Christenson and Debra S. Christenson executed
an installment promissory note payable to Bette Wycalis and her
3

mother, Eva Robertson, in the amount of $61,800.00.

(R. 493,

plaintiff's exhibit #1.)
2.

On or about June 26, 1980, defendant R & C, as trustor,

by and through Roy L. Miller, general partner, executed, as
security for payment of the July 1, 1980, promissory note, a
second trust deed.

Guardian Title Company was the trustee and

Bette Wycalis and Eva Robertson were beneficiaries on the trust
deed.
3.

(R. 493, plaintiff's exhibit 2.)
Mrs. Robertson has assigned her interest in the trust

deed note and trust deed to respondent Wycalis. The amount
owed on the deed of trust and unpaid is the sum of $53,660.44,
principal with interest at the rate of 10.5%.
4.

(R. 493.)

The trust deed of June 26, 1980, described property

located in Weber County, State of Utah.

(plaintiff's exhibit

2.)
5.

Sometime prior to December 26, 1980, Guardian Title

received a forged, although acknowledged, request for
reconveyance.

That reconveyance purported to bear the

signatures of Mrs. Robertson and Wycalis. However, the
signatures on the request for reconveyance are not the
signatures of Mrs. Robertson or Wycalis. There is no evidence
that defendants Krantz or Christenson were involved in
obtaining the request, or in delivering the request to
Guardian, nor did they have any knowledge of its preparation of
its delivery.

(R. 493 * 494, plaintiff's exhibit 3.)
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6.

On December 26, 1980, Guardian executed and recorded a

deed of reconveyance, thus divesting Wycalis of her security
interest*
7.

(R. 494, plaintiff's exhibit 4.)

A portion of the property which was reconveyed was

again encumbered in favor of Wycalis and Robertson by another
trust deed on December 29, 1980.

(R. 494, plaintiff's exhibit

5.)
8.

On or about April 4, 1981, Guardian received another

request for reconveyance, again purportedly
Wycalis and Robertson,

executed by

These signatures are also not the

signatures of Wycalis and Robertson.

(R. 494, plaintiff's

exhibit 6.)
9.

Guardian executed a deed of reconveyance with respect

to the December 29, 1980, trust deed on April 4, 1981.

This

deed of reconveyance was recorded by Guardian on July 6, 1981.
(R. 494 * 495, plaintiff's exhibit 7.)
10.

The fair market value of the property described in the

July 26, 1980, trust deed, which secured the promissory note,
would have been more than sufficient to have satisfied tne note
held by Wycalis.
11.

(R. 495.)

Neither Christenson nor Krantz had any interest in the

equity of the property conveyed as security for the promissory
note.

Krantz and Christenson paid a consideration in the

amount of $2,000 for the use of the security.
498.)

5

(R. 495, 497 4

12.

Had the security for the note not been reconveyed by

Guardian, Wycalis would have looked solely to the security for
the satisfaction of the debt owed to her by the makers of the
note.

(R. 495.)

13.

The note and deed of trust were prepared by Guardian

Title Company of Utah and were delivered by Guardian to Krantz,
who then delivered those documents to an attorney for Wycalis.
(R. 495.)
14.

R & C Associates and Roy Miller, its general partner,

have filed in bankruptcy.

(R. 495 * 496.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Krantz and Christenson are parties to the contract
evidenced by the promissory note and trust deed and Guardian
Title Company is, therefore, the agent of Krantz and
Christenson.

By reason of the agency relationship between

Krantz and Christenson and Guardian Title Company, Krantz and
Christenson are bound by the acts of Guardian which resulted in
the loss of the security.

Therefore, the one action rule is

not applicable because the loss of the security was not the
fault of Wycalis, and Wycalis is entitled to judgment against
Krantz and Christenson for the amount due and owing on the
note, including interest, costs, and attorney's fees.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS KRANTZ AND CHRISTENSON ARE PARTIES TO THE
CONTRACT EVIDENCED BY THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND TRUST DEED
6

Krantz and Christenson urge that the district court erred
in determining that the trustee under the subject deed of trust
was the agent for Krantz and Christenson.
Christenson brief pages 6*11.)

(Krantz and

It is clear however, that the

district court did not err in this regard.

This is shown by

the facts of this case and applicable case law.
It is undisputed that Krantz and Christenson are co4makers
on the promissory note.

(R. 493, plaintiff's exhibit 1.)

Although it is true that Krantz and Chrijstenson were not
trustors of the deed of trust, the presence of their signatures
on the promissory note is sufficient to establish Krantz and
Christenson as parties to the contract evidenced by the note
and the trust deed.

This is so for three reasons.

First, as

noted, it is undisputed that Krantz and Christenson signed the
promissory note.

Second, it is also undisputed that the note

was secured by the deed of trust (plaintiff's exhibit 1) and
that the trust deed was executed for th^ purpose of securing
payment of the note.

(Plaintiff's exhibit 2.)

Third, it is

established Utah law that although a promissory note which is
secured by a mortgage and the mortgage may be separate
documents, they are not separate contracts.

(American Savings

and Loan Association v. Bloomquist, 445 P.2d 1, Utah 1968.)
This holding in American Savings is a special application
of the general rule of contracts which provides that where two
or more instruments are executed by the same parties at or near
7

the same time, in the course of the same transaction,
concerning the same subject matter, they will be read and
construed together.

(Bullfrog Marina Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d

266 at 270 * 271, Utah 1972.)

In Bullfrog, plaintiff, a

corporation, was a concessionaire of the National Park Service
and had the exclusive right to operate tourist facilities at
Bullfrog basin on Lake Powell, San Juan County, Utah.
Plaintiff and defendant executed a lease agreement and an
employment agreement.

Defendant was employed by plaintiff to

operate a house boat rental service.

The lease provided that

defendant was to lease to Bullfrog Marina Inc. three houseboats
for a period of two years.

The issue on appeal was whether the

trial court erred in the holding that the lease and the
employment contract were an integration.

In affirming the

trial court's determination that the lease and employment
agreement were an integration, this court stated:
The trial court did not err in following the rule of
law that where two or more instruments are executed by the
same parties contemporaneously, or at different times in
the course of the same transaction, and concern the same
subject matter, they will be read and construed together so
far as determining the respective rights and interests of
the parties, although they do not in terms refer to each
other. (Id. at 271, emphasis added.)
In American Savings, supra, the court held that this rule
of integration of contracts was applicable to an acceleration
provision in a mortgage securing a note.

American Savings

commenced an action to foreclose a real estate mortgage on the
residence of defendants.

At trial, the court found that there
8

were no issues of fact to be submitted to the jury and rendered
a judgment of foreclosure for plaintiff.

Defendants1 appealed

urging that the trial court erred in ruling that the debt
evidenced by the note was properly accelerated under the terms
of the mortgage.

This court affirmed the trial court's ruling

by stating:
Under the majority rule, an acceleration provision of
a mortgage securing a note enters into and becomes a part
of the note, so that the maturity of the note is advanced
in like manner with the maturity of the mortgage. The
courts proceed on the theory that the note and rortgage,
though separate instruments, are not separate contracts,
but, being executed at the same time and in the course of
the same transaction, constituted a single contract.
(American Savings and Loan Association v. Bloomguist, at 3
* 4. )
That Krantz and Christenson are parties to the contract
evidenced by the note and trust deed is unrefutable in view of
these authorities and particularly in view of the Bullfrog
decision.

In Bullfrog this court held the contracts integrated

even though neither document made reference to the other.

In

the instant case, both the note and the trust deed clearly
reference each other.

The note specifically provides that the

"... note and the interest thereon is secured by a Second Trust
Deed dated June 26, 1980, on property located in Weber County,
Utah."

(Plaintiff's exhibit 1.)

Reciprocally, the trust deed

provides that the trust deed is executed "... FOR THE PURPOSE
OF SECURING PAYMENT of the indebtedness evidenced by a
promissory note of even date herewith..4."
Clearly, if documents, as in Bullfrog, which make no
9

reference to each other are an integration, the note and trust
deed in this case, which were executed at or near the same
time, by the same parties, in the course of the same
transaction, concerning the same subject matter, and which
clearly reference each other must be construed as a single
contract.
POINT II
THE CONTRACT GIVES RISE TO AN AGENCY BETWEEN
KRANTZ AND CHRISTENSON AND THE TRUSTEE
Krantz and Christenson urge that the district court erred
in holding that Krantz and Christenson were the principals of
the trustee.

(Krantz and Christenson' brief page 6.)

In

support of this contention Krantz and Christenson argue that
they were not parties to the trust deed and that there is no
contractual basis for the finding of agency.
Christenson1 brief, page 7.)

(Krantz and

As discussed in point I above,

there is ample authority for the conclusion that Krantz and
Christenson were parties to the contract evidenced by the
promissory note and deed of trust.
Since Krantz and Christenson were parties to the contract,
the question is whether the contract gives rise to an agency
relationship between Krantz and Christenson and Guardian, the
trustee.

Review of applicable authorities answers this

question in the affirmative.

Section 15 of the Restatement

10

(2nd) of Agency provides as follows:
Manifestations of Consent
An agency relation exists only if there is a
manifestation by the principal to the agent that the agent
may act on his account, and consent by the agent so to act.
In this case, the two requirements for an agency are
satisfied.

The manifestation by Krantz and Christenson to the

trustee that the trustee was authorized to act on Krantz and
Christenson's behalf appears in the contlract evidenced by the
note and trust deed.

The promissory note clearly references

the trust deed (and visa versa) and the trust deed provides
that the property was conveyed to Guardian as trustee for the
purpose of securing the promissory note.,
2.)

(Plaintiff's exhibit.

Further, under Utah trust deed statute, the trustee has

the power to reconvey (§574H33), the exercise of which,
resulted in damage to Wycalis.

Since the terms of the contract

provide for appointment of Guardian as trustee, and since the
Krantz and Christenson are parties to that contract, adequate
evidence exists showing a manifestation by Krantz and
Christenson that Guardian was empowered to act as agent and
trustee on Krantz and Christenson's behalf.
The second requirement of agency is satisfied because
Guardian consented to act as agent for krantz and Christenson.
This is shown by two facts.

First, the trust deed and

promissory note were prepared by Guardian and delivered to
appellant Krantz, who then delivered th^ documents to Wycalis'
11

attorney.

(R. 495.)

Secondly, as shown by the recording

information on the trust deed, the trust deed was recorded at
the request of Guardian Title.

(plaintiff's exhibit 2.)

It is clear from the trust deed and the promissory note
that Krantz and Christenson consented to Guardian's acting as
their agent and that Guardian agreed to act in this capacity,
thus establishing an agency between the parties.
POINT III
KRANTZ AND CHRISTENSON HAVE AN INTEREST
IN THE SECURITY
The district court held that Krantz and Christenson had an
interest in the security.
error for two reasons.

(R. 539.)

This conclusion is not in

First, as found by the district court,

Krantz and Christenson paid a consideration for the use of the
security and therefor had an interest in the same.

(R. 539.)

Second, that Krantz and Christenson have an interest in the
security is confirmed by Krantz- and Christenson in their
assertion that they are entitled to the protection from
judgment afforded by the one action or security first rule.
(Krantz and Christenson brief page 11 313.)
The one action rule (§78*37*1) provides as follows:
There can be one action for the recovery of any debt
or the enforcement of any right secured solely by mortgage
upon real estate which action must be in accordance with
the provisions of this chapter.
The one action rule has been held applicable to deeds of trust
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in Utah.

(Salt Lake Valley Loan and Trust Company v.

Millspaugh, et al., 54 P. 892, Utah 1898.)

It is also the rule

that where property is given in trust as security for payment
of a note, the security must first be exhausted before other
property can be resorted to for payment of the debt.

This

principal was recently affirmed in Bawden and Associates v.
Smith, 646 P.2d 711 (Utah, 1982).

It is the application of

this aspect of the security first rule which Krantz and
Christenson claim to be entitled.

(Appellant's brief page 11,

13.)
It is Krantz and Christenson's argument that, since
Wycalis' agent Gu-ardian Title lost the security, and since, as
argued, Guardian was not Krantz and Chrijstenson's agent, Krantz
and Christenson are protected from judgment since Wycalis1
agent released the security and Wycalis is bound by the acts of
her agent.

(Krantz and Christensonfs brief page 11-<13.)

Having already addressed the agency question; and reserving the
question of whether Krantz and Christenson are entitled to the
protection of the one action rule for later discussion (Point V
below), attention is directed to the assertion by Krantz and
Christenson that they have standing to claim protection under
the one action rule and the implication that assertion has upon
the issue of whether Krantz and Christenson have an interest in
the security.
It should be apparent that if Krantz and Christenson have
13

standing to assert protection of the security first rule, that
the rights giving rise to that standing must have originated in
the contact between the debtors, the creditor and the trustee.
As previously discussed, this court held in Bullfrog that where
two or more documents are executed by the same parties, at or
near the same time, in the course of the same transaction, and
pertaining to the same subject matter, the documents will be
construed together "so far as determining the respective rights
and interests of the parties".

(Bullfrog at 271.)

Here,

Krantz and Christenson, obligors under the contract, seek to
enforce the security first rule against Wycalis, obligee under
the same contract-.

Any standing to assert the rule must

therefore rise by reason of Krantz and Christenson's status as
debtors of a secured obligation.

Therefore, Krantz and

Christenson have an interest in the security without which they
would not have standing to assert the security first rule.
POINT IV
KRANTZ AND CHRISTENSON'S INTEREST IN THE SECURITY
IS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE AGENCY
It is established that Krantz and Christenson have an
interest in the security.

As a consequence, it follows that

the trustee is the agent of Krantz and Christenson.

This is so

because as co4makers who have an interest in the security,
Krantz and Christenson derive a benefit as required by
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §14.
brief page 7.)

(Krantz and Christenson

Krantz and Christenson derive a benefit from
14

the security because the security enabled them to purchase
property from Wycalis.

Further benefit is derived from the

security because, had their agent not released the security,
they would be entitled to the protection afforded by the
security first rule.

Clearly, Krantz and Christenson derived a

benefit from their interest in the security.
Krantz and Christenson assert, however, that no agency can
exist because the second requirement of an agency, that of
control, is absent.

In support of this contention, Krantz and

Christenson refer to several statutory provisions which
identify powers of, or control by, the beneficiary.
and Christenson brief page 8.)

(Krantz

These provisions, however, show

only the presence of control by a beneficiary and do not
evidence an absence of control on the part of Krantz and
Christenson.

More importantly, however, is the fact that even

if there is an absence of control on the part of Krantz and
Christenson, that absence of control is a consequence of the
terms and conditions of the contract; a contract which was
negotiated, bargained for, and freely entered by Krantz and
Christenson.

A contract which is clear upon its face that

Krantz and Christenson were debtors to Wycalis, that the
security for the debt was provided by R & C Associates, and
where the clear and unequivocal terms of the contract state
that the security was to be held in trust and Guardian was to
act as trustee.

The contract was bargained for and freely
15

entered by Krantz and Christenson, it is their contract, they
negotiated its terms and they are bound by the same.
Further, it is Utah law that in determining the respective
rights of the parties to an integration, that courts will look
to all documents evidencing the contract.
271.)

(Bullfrog, supra, at

Here the terms of the contact provide that Krantz and

Christenson are debtors and that Guardian was the trustee.
This court has approved language which states that "a trustee
named in a deed of trust to secure a loan sustains a fiduciary
relation to the debtor as well as the creditor . ..."

(Blodgett

v. Marstch, 590 P.2d 298 at 302, citing Spruill v. Ballard, 61
App.D.C. 112, 58 F.2d 517, 1932.)

In accordance with this

language and by reason of the terms of the contract as well as
by reason of Krantz and Christenson's interest in the security,
Guardian Title, trustee, is the fiduciary of Krantz and
Christenson.
POINT V
KRANTZ AND CHRISTENSON ARE BOUND BY THE ACTS OF
THEIR AGENT, WHOSE ACTS RENDERED THE SECURITY
FIRST RULE INAPPLICABLE
Krantz and Christenson are bound by the acts of their
agent.

It is a fundamental principal of agency recognized in

Utah law that a principal is bound by, and is liable for, an
act which the agent does with or within the actual or apparent
authority.

(Forsyth v. Pendalton, 617 P.2d 358, Utah 1980;
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Wells v. Walker Bank and Trust Company, 590 P.2d 1261, Utah
1979; Jones v. Mutual Creamry Company, 17, P.2d 256, Utah 1932.)
As previously indicated, the one action rule has been held
applicable to deeds of trust in Utah.
and Trust Company, supra.)

(gait Lake Valley Loan

As also stated, it is the rule that

where property is given in trust as security for payment of the
note, the security must first be exhausted before other
property of the debtor can be resorted to for payment of the
debt.

(Bawden and Associates v. Smith, supra.)

However, an

exception to this rule requiring the exhaustion of the security
exists where the the security has been lost through no fault of
the mortgagee.

A« was stated in Cache Valley Banking v. Logan

Lodge #1453, BPQE, 56 P.2d 1046, Utah 1936.
It is true that in this state there can be but one
action upon the debt secured by a mortgage and that the
personal liability of the mortgagor cannot be enforced
until the security has been exhausted (National Bank of
Commerce v. James Pingree Company, 2|18 P 552, Utah 1923),
but it has also been held that, where the security has been
lost through no fault of the mortgagee, an action may be
maintained directly upon the personal obligation evidenced
by the note without going through the idle and fruitless
procedure of foreclosure (Donaldson v. Grant, 49 P. 779,
Utah 1897) . (Id. at 1049. )
In Cache Valley Banking Company plaintiff sued to recover a
promissory note secured by a trust deed in second position
behind a trust deed in favor of Beneficial Life Insurance
Company.

The Beneficial Life trust deed had been foreclosed

prior to the commencement of the action on the promissory
note.

By reason of this foreclosure, plaintiff was divested of
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all right, title, claim, lien and demand against the premises
and the security of defendants1 second mortgage was entirely
exhausted, leaving the note unsecured.

In quoting the

California Supreme Court in Savings Bank v. Central Market
Company, 122 Cal. 28, 54 P. 273, 276 (1898), the Utah court
stated:
I know of no rule of law or equity which requires the
second mortgagee to bring suit to recover his debt when the
first mortgagee saw fit to do so. It is apparent that had
he foreclosed, he would have received nothing. I cannot
conceive upon what theory the mortgagor, or any other
payors, can complain that he did not do so. Plaintiff no
longer has a lien upon the property, and his debt is not
now secured by a mortgage. He did not voluntarily release
his security. He has not waived nor lost it by his
negligence .... (Cache Valley Banking Company at 1049.)
Similarly, the trial court found that Wycalis' security was
lost through no fault of her own. 9 (R. 540, 545.)

The trustee

of Wycalis1 trust deed executed and recorded a deed of
reconveyance which was not authorized by Wycalis.
544.)

(R. 538,

Upon the recordation of the deed of reconveyance,

Wycalis was divested of her security interest.

(R. 539, 544.)

Wycalis did not voluntarily release her security and did not
lose it by way of her own negligence.

(R. 540, 545.)

It was

lost by the wrongful reconveyance executed by the trustee.

(R.

538, 544.)
As in Cache Valley Banking Company in which the court held
that foreclosure of the first trust deed did not precluded
plaintiff from bringing an action on the note, the wrongful
reconveyance and resulting loss of plaintiff's security does
18

not preclude her from bringing an action on the debt.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in entering judgment
against Krantz and Christenson for the amount due and owing on
the debt.

This is so because Guardian was clearly acting

within its authority when it reconveyed Wycalis1 security
interest.

Because Guardian is the agent of Krantz and

Christenson as well as Wycalis, Krantz and Christenson are
bound by the trustee's acts and are not excused from
performance on the promissory note.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in entering
judgment against Krantz and Christenson for the amount due and
owing on the debt.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err in granting judgment against
defendants Krantz and Christenson.

Krantz and Christenson are

makers on a promissory note secured by a trust deed.

The agent

of Wycalis, who was also the agent of Krantz and Christenson,
wrongfully reconveyed the trust property and therefore the
security was exhausted through no fault of Wycalis.

Wycalis is

entitled to judgment against Krantz and Christenson as makers

of the n o t e . / ^ 7
5

Dated:

^

—

/nijuftt

/

/& , 1986.

SHERMAN C. YOU^G
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Joseph E. Hatch
Attorney at Law
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Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Eric P. Hartman
Attorney at Law
2120 South 1300 East #301
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
David R. Money
George w. Pratt
Attorneys at Law
1500 1st Interstate Plaza
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
SHERMAN C.
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A D D E N D U M
Promissory note dated July 1, 1980
Second trust deed dated June 26, 1980
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INSTALLMENT PROMISSORY M/TE

Juiy.^1

• 6JL,.8.CLQ.*..Q.Q

19

80

For value received, I, we, or either of us, promise to pay to the order of ..^BETTE M VreCALIS M .and.
EVA ROBERTSON
at ....3.Q8...Npr.th....40.0..East < .Pay.son, U t *
SIXTY-ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED A N D N O / 1 0 0

t the

sum of
DOLLARS

together with interest on the unpaid balance thereof from date at the rate of

A9.:J?.*

annum, in lawful money of the United States, in monthly installments of t 7.56....5.2
... l.s.t

day of each and every month beginning with the ..._?.?:

day of

percent per
each on the

_.?.^.!r

19..8.CL , and continuing until the whole thereof shall have been fully paid.
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers of this note jointly and severally agree that if any installment is not
paid when due, that the whole of the principal sum then remaining unpaid, together with the accrued interest thereon
shall forthwith become due and payable at the option of the holder of this note, and that beginning with the date of such
default the whole of said unpaid principal shall bear interest at the rate of >&percent per annum both, before and
after judgment.
10.5
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally consent to renewals and extensions at or after maturity hereof and waive presentment for payment, notice of dishonor, protest and notice thereof, and agree to pay a
reasonable attorney's fee, together with all costs and expenses incurred* in the event that this note is placed in the
hands of any attorney for collection.
R & Cy*V8SOCIATES ,
Address

Address ...95.4 .KaJLden..H.;U.ls...D.i;ily.e..,
SLC, UTAH

2. ...

Address
Address

Price, Utah

84501

<•

n

E%

^TnTCJ?^

4EO^L&&SMW^-

June 26, 1980
his note and the
... interest
...r
.. secured
.___
thereon is
by a Second*Trust Deea dated
1 property 1Ocated ln Weber County.Utah.

WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:

RUTH S ^

JL# i AyJil|tlliWH'M

>fcN

OEPUi - $ W * ^ d l ^

JUL 15 I I 2 5 AM fB0
Space Above for Jlecorderfe.Daeu riujhtjD f Qfr

%rusi pttb
THIS TRUST DEED is made this 26th day of
between

PLATTED

•

ENTERED

Q MICROFILMED

June

,19 80

R & C ASSOCIATES, a general partnership

whose address is

,

, as Trustor,

Bountiful
(Street and Number)

VERIFIED

Utah

(City)

(State)

GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF UTAH

, as Trustee,* and

BETTE WYCALIS and EVA ROBERTSON

. fls Beneficiary.

Trustor hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER
OF SALE, the following described property situated in

Weber

County, Utah:
n

I

0
I

Beginning at a point which lies South 0°28*07 West 949.73 feet
and North 89031'16M East 50.01 feet of the Northwest Corner of
the Southwest Quarter of Section 12, Township 5 North, Range 2
West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89°33,00"
East 247.36 feet to the Weber-Davis Canal; thence South 21°03,35"
West along said canal 106.85 feet; thence South 89°33,00M West
209.78 feet to the East Right-of-Way line of 1900 West Street;
thence North 0°28 , 07" East along said Right-of-Way line 99.42
feet to the point of beginning.
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way,
easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances
thereunto now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory
note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $ 61,800.00
, payable to the order of
Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein set forth, and payment of any
sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary to protect the security hereof.
Trustor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on the above property, to pay all charges and
assessments on water or water stock used on or with said property, not to commit waste, to maintain
adequate fire insurance on improvements on said property, to pay all costs and expenses of collection (including Trustee's and attorney's fees in event of default in payment of the indebtedness secured hereby) and to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services performed by Trustee
hereunder, including a reconveyance hereof.
The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth.
..R..A.C.AS^IATESJ^

Mi "J^r^^J^K..
Roy L . K f l l e r

general partner

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF S a l t Lake
On the 26th

day of

June

, 19 80

t

personally appeared before me

ROY L. MILLER who being duly sworn did say that he is a general partner of R & C
ASSOCIATES, a general partnership and that said instrument was siqned in behalf of
said partnership by authority, and said ROY L. MILLER acknowledged to me that he as
such.^enferal jpbtfper executed the same in the name of the partnership.
3

^ /
My Commission Expires: June 2 8 , 1981

Residing at:

Notary Public

'

K a y s v i l l e , Utah

•NOTE: Trustee must be a member of the Utah Stale Bar, a bank, building and loan association or wavinjjs and
loan association authorized to do such business in Utah; a corporation authorized to do a trust business in
Utah; or • title insurance or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah.
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